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IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF FULTON COUm~~---__ _ 
STATE OF GEORGIA FILED IN OFFICE 
SLEEP SERVICES OF AMERICA, INC. ) 
and DO YOU SNORE OF 
MARYLAND, LLC, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
RENEE MCPHEE, RANDAL A. LENZ, ) 
JEFFREY KUNKES, M.D. and ) 
MCPHEE PROPERTIES, LLC, ) 
Defendants, 
) 
) 
) 
MAY .2 1 2008 
DEPUTY CLERK SUPERIOR COURT 
FULTON COUNTY. GA 
Civil Action File No. 2007-CV-143860 
ORDER ON MOTION TO DISMISS 
On May 14, 2008, Counsel appeared before the Court to present oral argument on Defendant 
Lenz's Motion to Dismiss. After reviewing the briefs submitted on the Motion, the arguments of 
counsel, and the record of the case, the Court finds as follows: 
FACTS 
This case arises from an Asset Purchase Agreement ("AP A"), dated April 2, 2007, entered into 
between Defendant McPhee and the Plaintiffs for the purchase of substantially all of the assets of three 
of McPhee's companies ("GA Sleep Services"). Defendant Lenz was not a party to the APA. 
Defendant Lenz was involved in the negotiation ofthe AP A as a certified public accountant and 
attorney representing Defendant McPhee. In addition, Defendant Lenz was involved in the operations 
ofGA Sleep Services, although the degree of his involvement is disputed by the parties. His 
involvement, however, is evidenced by the APA definition of "Sellers' Knowledge" which includes 
the knowledge of Defendant Lenz. 
1 
STANDARD 
"A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim should be sustained if the allegations of the 
complaint reveal, with certainty, that the Plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
provable facts asserted in support of the Complaint." LaSonde v. Chase Mortgage Co., 259 Ga. App. 
772, 774 (2003). 
FRAUD 
Defendant Lenz argues that the merger clause in the APA prevents Plaintiffs' recovery under 
fraud. See Estate of Sam Farkas, Inc. v. Clark, 238 Ga. App. 115, 118 (1999) ("Where the party ... 
affirms the contract, however, he or she is bound by its terms. In this case, the contract's" merger" 
provision would estop a party bound by the terms of the contract from arguing that he or she relied on 
representations other than those contained in the contract."). Plaintiffs argue that their claims against 
Defendant Lenz, who was not a party to the AP A, are not limited by the merger clause. In GSA 
Strategic Investment Fund, Ltd. v. Joseph Charles & Associates, Inc., 245 Ga. App. 460 (2000), a case 
cited by Defendant Lenz, the Georgia Court of Appeals held that it was an error for the trial court to 
dismiss fraud claims against the broker. The Court of Appeals reasoned that "[t]he broker cannot rely 
on the merger clause to bar those claims because the broker was not a party the Agreement." Id. at 463. 
Thus, the merger clause in the APA does not limit Plaintiffs' ability to bring fraud claims against 
Defendant Lenz. 
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that their fraud claims against Defendant Lenz are based upon 
misrepresentations contained in the representations and warranties of the APA. Specifically, Plaintiffs 
allege Defendant Lenz had knowledge that representations such as those regarding the financial 
statements and side agreements with Dr. Kunkes were false. Assuming the veracity of Plaintiffs' 
claims on this Motion to Dismiss, such misrepresentations would be incorporated into the AP A and 
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recoverable by a fraud claim notwithstanding the merger clause. Estate of Sam Farkas, Inc., 238 Ga. 
App. at 118 (holding that the merger clause only bars claims of misrepresentation "not contained 
within the contract."). 
Defendant Lenz argues that he is shielded from any fraud liability because he included 
appropriate accountant disclaimers to the financial statements attached to the AP A. Defendant Lenz 
directs the Court to First National Bank of Newton County v. Sparkmon, 212 Ga. App. 558, 559 
(1994), where the Court of Appeals held that the accountant's disclaimers were "effective to preclude 
any justifiable reliance by a third party ... ". Accountant disclaimers are effective to preclude 
negligence liability because an unaudited compilation statement, "does not involve an independent 
examination by the accountant of the financial information .... " Dakota Bank v. Eiesland, 645 N.W.2d 
177 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (discussing accountant negligence liability and adopting the reasoning in 
First Nat'l Bank of Newton Co. v. Sparkmon). In First National Bank of Newton County, 212 Ga. 
App. 558, the accountant was an unrelated and uninvolved third party. In the instant case, however, 
Defendant Lenz not only served as the accountant creating the AP A financial statements, but he also 
acted as the attorney negotiating the AP A and was involved in the operations of GA Sleep Services 
prior to the AP A. Furthennore, the AP A defines "sellers' knowledge" as the actual knowledge of 
Defendant Lenz. 
Additionally, the cases relied upon by Defendant Lenz are professional negligence suits where 
the Court of Appeals addressed accountant liability in the absence of "intentional misrepresentations or 
fraud." Id.; see also MacNerland v. Barnes, 129 Ga. App. 367 (1973); Robert & Co. Assoc. v. Rhodes-
Haverty Partnership, 250 Ga. 680 (1983); Badische Corp. v. Caylor, 257 Ga. 131 (1987). Here, 
Plaintiffs claim intentional misrepresentation and fraud alleging that Defendant Lenz had actual 
knowledge that the financial statements and the underlying data were inaccurate. 
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Finally, Defendant Lenz argues that the Exclusive Remedy section of the APA bars Plaintiffs 
from seeking recovery against him. This argument is without merit because Defendant Lenz was not a 
party to the APA and because the language provides a fraud exception to the exclusivity of the 
remedies. Accordingly, it does not limit Plaintiffs' remedies on fraud claims against any party whether 
or not a party to the AP A. 
Because of Defendant Lenz's involvement with the companies being sold, his role in 
negotiating the APA, and the allegations of intentional misrepresentation, the Court hereby DENIES 
Defendant Lenz's Motion to Dismiss the fraud claims against him. 
GARICO 
Defendant Lenz petitions the Court to dismiss the Georgia RICO count against him because he 
alleges that the single transaction event contemplated in the AP A is insufficient, as a matter of law, to 
establish a "pattern" of racketeering activity. Plaintiffs counter that their Complaint alleges several 
predicate acts of mail and wire fraud which culminated in the asset sale under the AP A. In 2002, the 
Georgia Legislature amended the definition of "pattern" to including [e]ngaging in at least two acts of 
racketeering activity in furtherance of one or more incidents, scheme, or transactions that have the 
same or similar intents, results ... ". O.CG.A. § 16-14-3(8) (emphasis added). The language ofthe 
amended statute contemplates the very scenario Defendant argues is excluded from the statute. In the 
absence of case law limiting such language, this Court is bound by the statute's clear directive. 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for failure to allege a pattern sufficient to sustain an actionable RICO 
claim is hereby DENIED. 
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AIDING AND ABETTING FRAUD 
Defendant Lenz petitions the Court to dismiss the aiding and abetting fraud claim against him on 
the grounds that Georgia case law does not recognize such an action. Defendant Lenz's argument 
highlights an important legal development in Georgia. Since the 2006 decision in Insight Technology, 
Inc., v. FreightCheck LLC, 280 Ga. App. 19 (2006), the Court of Appeals opened the door to recognize 
an aiding and abetting cause of action in Georgia. In a 2008 decision, the Southern District of Georgia 
held that Georgia recognizes an action for aiding and abetting fraud finding that "[ f]raud is certainly an 
"actionable wrong" within the language of O.C.G.A. § 51-12-30, and therefore the Court will apply the 
tort of aiding and abetting fraud ... " In re Friedman's Inc., 2008 WL 131163, *34 (S.D.Ga. 2008); cf. 
Hays v. Paul, Hastings, lanofsky & Walker LLP, 2006 WL 4448809, *8 (N.D.Ga. 2006) (declining to 
recognize the tort of aiding and abetting fraud and basing it, in part, on the requirement for such claims 
in other states to allege actual knowledge of fraud). Here, Plaintiffs allege that Defendant Lenz had 
actual knowledge of Defendant McPhee's fraud, which would be sufficient to survive a motion to 
dismiss under a traditional aiding and abetting fraud claim. See ZP No. 54 Ltd. Part. v. Fidelity and 
Deposit Co. of Maryland, 917 So.2d 368, 372 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) ("Virtually all courts that have 
acknowledged the existence of aiding and abetting a fraud state that the following are the elements that 
must be established by the plaintiff: (l)[t]here existed an underlying fraud, (2)[t]he defendant had 
knowledge of the fraud, [and] (3) [t]he defendant provided substantial assistance to advance the 
commission of the fraud. "). In light of the developing body of Georgia law on the claim of aiding and 
abetting fraud, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant Lenz's Motion to Dismiss. 
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CONSPIRACY & PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
In light of the Court's ruling on the substantive claims, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant 
Lenz's Motion to Dismiss the conspiracy to commit fraud and punitive damages counts. See Cook v. 
Robinson, 216 Ga. 328 (1960); Trust Co. Bank v. C&S Trust Co., 260 Ga. 124 (1990). 
SO ORDERED this ~ day of May, 2008. 
ALICE D. BONNER/or 
ELIZABETH E. LONG, SENIOR JUDGE 
Superior Court of Fulton County 
Atlanta Judicial Circuit 
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